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Abstract
An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching sub-
sidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this
result extends to ‘unit donation’ schemes, a popular alternative form of solic-
iting donations. There, the donors’ choices are about the number of units of a
charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money
to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit
price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: The three
subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregate level, rebates
lead to a higher likelihood of giving while matching and discount subsidies lead
to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation
scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates
merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.
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1 Introduction
Subsidies are a common way of incentivizing charitable giving. They typically
take the shape of rebates, in which a third party (e.g., the government) refunds
a fraction r of the gift back to the donor; or the shape of matches, in which
a third party (e.g., a generous donor) supplements each donation at a rate m,
such that the charity receives a total of (1 + m) times the original donation.
Both rebates and matches have been extensively studied and several key findings
have emerged in the literature (see Vesterlund, 2016; Epperson and Reif, 2019,
for comprehensive reviews). Probably the most notable result is that although
rebates and matches imply the same price of giving if the corresponding subsidy
rates r and m satisfy r = m
m+1
, overall donations received by the charity are
higher under matches than under equivalent rebates (Eckel and Grossman, 2003,
2006a,b, 2008b, 2017; Davis et al., 2005; Lukas et al., 2010; Bekkers, 2015;
Gandullia and Lezzi, 2018; Gandullia, 2019).1 Another finding is that matching
subsidies often significantly increase private contributions net of the subsidy
compared to a no subsidy condition without a lead donor (e.g. Karlan and List,
2007; Gneezy et al., 2014; Huck et al., 2015; Eckel and Grossman, 2017).2
The literature has established these findings in a setting in which individuals
are asked to decide how much money to give to a charity, arguably the most
common scheme for soliciting donations. We refer to this as a money donation
scheme. Yet another frequently applied strategy is to frame the donor’s choice
variable not in terms of money, but in terms of physical units of a charitable
good awaiting funding. A prominent example that has attracted about one
million donors from all over the world is ShareTheMeal, a smartphone app and
initiative of the UN World Food Programme, which is used to provide food to
1In this literature, rebates are realized without any delay. If a delay is involved (as is the
case for tax deductions), time preference need to be considered.
2There are important counterexamples to this finding, however (e.g. Eckel and Grossman,
2008b; Karlan et al., 2011).
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children in need. Donors for ShareTheMeal do not directly choose an amount
of money to give. Instead, they are informed that feeding one child for a day
costs $0.50 and are then asked to announce the number of feeding days that
they would like to fund.3 We refer to this alternative scheme as a unit donation
scheme.
Do the key findings about the effects of matches and rebates in money do-
nations generalize to the alternative unit donation scheme? In this paper, we
examine the effect of subsidies on unit donations by conducting an online field
experiment. The 558 subjects are asked to decide how many units of a charita-
ble good they would like to provide to a predetermined charity, funded out of
their reward for answering an unrelated online survey. The decision variable is
framed in quantities of nutritional packages provided for malnourished children.
The unsubsidized price is $0.50 per package. In the baseline, no subsidy is of-
fered. The main treatments differ across three subsidy types and two subsidy
rates. The first type, the rebate, is offered at a rate of either 33% or 50% such
that a third party refunds to the subject one third or one half of the reward
she spent on nutritional packages. The second type, the match, is offered at a
rate of 0.5 (1:2) or 1 (1:1) such that a third party adds a nutritional package
for either every two or each package donated. The third subsidy type is novel
for public goods and takes the form of a price discount of either 33% or 50%.
This subsidy type is without a direct parallel in money donations.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we define unit donations as
a separate class of charitable donations distinct from money donations. Second,
we investigate how rebates and matches perform in a setting of unit donations
and compare the results to the established literature on money donations. Based
on between-subjects evidence, our core result is that matches and rebates are
3Similar food provision campaigns are the “100 Thousand Meals” appeal of the Salvation
Army Australia or the “Help with e 2” campaign of Misereor, the German Catholic Bishops
Organisation for Development Cooperation.
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equally effective in incentivizing private net donations and in generating total
charity receipts. In other words, we do not replicate the superiority of matching
subsidies observed in the case of money donations. Third, we check whether, in
a setting of unit donations, the discount subsidy offers an attractive alternative
to these subsidy types. We find that discounts are equally effective as matches
and rebates when considering net donations or charity receipts. This may well
be good news for charities: In a world in which subsidy types perform equally
well, charities enjoy additional degrees of freedom in campaign design. At the
same time, the different subsidy types perform differently when disaggregated
into the extensive and the intensive margin of giving: Rebates are more effec-
tive than matches in attracting donors, but matches result in larger donations.
Under discounts, the likelihood to give is lower than under rebates, and on both
margins, behavior corresponds to that under matches. We conclude that if at-
tracting donors is a secondary objective of a fundraising campaign that uses
unit donations, rebates merit additional consideration. New donors offer the
possibility of an ongoing income stream for charities, since previous donors are
more likely to give in the future. (Eckel and Grossman, 2008b; Landry et al.,
2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In a background section
(section 2), we contrast money and unit donations, explain the mechanics of
subsidizing the latter, and review the relevant literature. Section 3 describes
our experimental design, followed by a presentation of our main results (section
4) and a comparison with the findings on money donations (section 5). Section
6 concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 Unit vs. Money Donations
For our purposes, we define a money donation as a solicitation scheme in which
potential donors are asked to decide how much money to give to a charity. It is
arguably the most common scheme for solicting donations. Academic papers in
the lineage of the now classic donation models (Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni,
1988, 1989) capture its main features by generally assuming a linear production
technology for the charitable public good and normalizing the per-unit price of
both the private and the public good to one. In such models, the prospective
donor i’s choice is to divide her endowment wi (in dollars) between private
consumption xi (in dollars) and giving gi (in dollars) to the charitable good,
G. Under a money donation scheme, therefore, the donor’s choice variable gi is
denominated in terms of monetary expenditures.
By contrast, we define a unit donation as a solicitation scheme that frames the
donor’s choice variable in terms of physical units of a charitable good awaiting
funding. Unit donation schemes are not only popular in food programs, such
as the ones discussed above. Development aid agencies, for example, promote
child sponsorships by fixing the monthly donation for the sponsorship – usually
around $35 – and prospective donors choose the number of child-months to
sponsor rather than the amount of money to donate. Similarly, fundraising
drives for biodiversity conservation or reforestation programs let donors indicate
the number of acres or trees to fund.4 In unit donation schemes, the price of a
unit of the charitable good G is no longer implicit. Instead, the fundraiser states
an explicit price p and asks how many discrete units gi the potential donor would
like to fund. In this respect, the setting resembles early models of the private
4For instance, in the Monarch Butterfly Habitat Exchange program of the Environmental
Defense Fund, donors sponsor acres of milkweed habitat for $35 per acre. In the Plant A Tree
program of the Jewish National Fund, donors choose the number of trees to be planted at
$18 a tree.
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provision of public goods that are explicit about units and prices (e.g., Warr,
1983). Under a unit donation scheme, therefore, the donor’s choice variable gi
is denominated in terms of the quantity of the charitable good funded.
Although under both schemes donors eventually provide money, there are
important differences between unit and money donations. First, donors’ choice
sets differ. Under a unit donation scheme, the units of the charitable good to be
provided are typically indivisible, which introduces an element of discreteness
that is largely absent in the virtually continuous money donations. Second, the
information provided to prospective donors differs. By stating the per-unit price
of the charitable good, unit donation schemes make statements about the char-
ity’s marginal cost of production, whereas money donation schemes frequently
provide little information on the cost structure of producing the charitable good.
While information on the share of fundraising and overhead costs is increasingly
available to donors (Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; Meer, 2014), information on the
impact of a contribution (or the absence thereof) can substantially affect dona-
tions (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; Lewis and Small, 2019). Third, the framing
of the choice differs. By asking for the number of physical units of the charita-
ble good, unit donation schemes emphasize how a donation generates specific
outcomes for recipients. As a result, the motive of giving to create an impact
(Duncan, 2004) might become more relevant for the donation decision.
Diederich et al. (2020) compare the two donation schemes in an experimental
study and show that the choice of the donation scheme significantly affects the
likelihood of receiving donations. The direction of the effect depends on the
size of a physical unit: A unit donation scheme attracts more donors if the unit
size is small but fewer donors if the unit size is large. For the large unit size,
the difference is primarily driven by the restricted choice set under the unit
donation scheme.
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2.2 Subsidizing Unit Donations
Subsidizing unit donations involves some small but important differences com-
pared to subsidizing money donations. In unit donations, rebates can be applied
by refunding a fraction of the donor’s provision costs back to the donor. If, for
example, a unit of the charitable good costs $0.50 and a 50% rebate is offered,
the donor receives $0.25 back for each unit funded. Matches can be applied
to unit donations by providing supplementary units of the charitable good. If,
for example, a 1:1 match is offered for tree plantings, the third party funds one
additional tree for each tree funded by the donor. Due to the indivisibility of
units, matching payments by the third party are restricted to complete units of
the charitable good. This introduces some discontinuity in the matching pay-
ment if the matching rate is not an integer: For example, at a matching rate
of 0.5 (1:2) every second tree funded by the donor induces one tree funded by
the third party. However, for a donation of only one tree, there is no additional
funding by the third party. This is in contrast to the continuous choice in money
donations, in which the matching rate typically applies to any arbitrary amount
in the same way (i.e. at a matching rate of 0.5, a donation of any dollar amount
induces a matching payment of 0.5 times this amount).
The transferability of results from money to unit donations is therefore not
only a matter of framing effects: When matches consist of supplementary units
and rebates are refunded costs, then rebates and matches are also no longer
theoretically equivalent. This is particularly evident at the extensive margin of
becoming a donor: The smallest positive donation is to fund one unit of the
charitable good. Given a unit price p, this implies a minimum expense of p
required under matches. In contrast, rebates provide a refund on the donation
given and, at subsidy rate of r, the cost of becoming a donor is p(1 − r) < p.
As a result, rebates are potentially more effective in attracting donors. An
additional difference comes into play when subsidy rates take non-integer values:
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The change in the matching payment due to a one unit increase in the donation
depends on the donation level. In contrast, under rebates any increase in the
donation proportionally increases the subsidy payment, as is the case for both
subsidy types under money donations. In sum, there are not only structural
differences between money and unit donations; there are also reasons to expect
that subsidies perform differently under the two schemes.
In our experiment, we additionally consider a third subsidy type, price dis-
counts, that is not found in money donations. In a unit donation scheme, each
physical unit of the charitable good is associated with an explicit price. This
allows a price discount of rate d to be offered such that the subject faces an
effective price of p(1 − d) < p, complemented with information about how the
price comes about. If, for example, a unit of the charitable good costs $0.50 and
a 50% discount is offered, the donor can fund one unit at a price of $0.25 while
being informed that the gap to the non-discounted price will be provided by
the third party. Discounts are theoretically equivalent to rebates, but two small
differences exist. First, rebate subsidies are paid to the donor whereas discount
subsidies are paid to the charity. Second, in comparison to both matches and
rebates, discounts obviate the need for donors to calculate the effective price of
giving.5
2.3 Related Literature
We are not aware of any previous study that conducts a clean comparison
between subsidy types under a pure unit donation scheme. At the same time,
there are parallels with a number of papers studying giving to public goods. Like
our study, Meier (2007) and Gneezy et al. (2014), for example, feature discrete
choice sets. However, both frame donations in money, rather than physical
5If rebates are realized with a delay, a third difference comes into play: Discounts lower
the price of giving ex ante whereas rebates lower it ex post. In this paper, rebates are always
realized without delay.
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quantities, and focus on matches only, yielding results that align with the wider
money donation literature. A different parallel is with Lewis and Small (2019)
who also provide subjects with information about the cost of a unit of impact
and test different framings of the information. They find that a cheaper unit
price leads to lower donations, an effect that is eliminated or reversed if the price
is framed in units-per-dollar rather than dollars-per-unit. Yet, donations in their
study are again framed in terms of money, rather than physical quantities, and
the authors do not compare different subsidy types. Also relevant is a literature
in marketing that experimentally compares product promotion strategies such
as coupons, rebates, price discounts, and matches. The papers in this literature
arrive at conflicting hypotheses and experimental findings (see e.g. Mishra and
Mishra, 2011; Chen et al., 2012), with matches outperforming discounts and vice
versa. More in line with the money donations literature are Davis and Millner
(2005) who find that matches outperform rebates also for private goods while
simple price reductions have an effect in between. While our focus on public
goods sets our paper apart from this literature, its setting of unit donations
offers the opportunity to study price discounts, a tool from private product
promotion, in the context of charitable donations.
The paper probably closest to the focus of ours is Kesternich et al. (2016).
The authors compare the effectiveness of rebate and matching subsidies in the
context of carbon offsetting: When buying their ticket(s) online, clients of a long
distance bus operator decide whether to offset the carbon emissions from their
travel at a given price per kilogram emissions. Rebates are found to increase
the likelihood to offset while matches only do so at certain matching rates and
to a lesser extent. However, the overall contributions net of the subsidy are
higher under matches. Key differences to our study are the binary decision
format and the use of an impure public good for which the size of giving is tied
to the private good. Both limit the comparability to our setup. A few other
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studies implicitly employ an experimental design soliciting unit donations to an
environmental public good (Löschel et al., 2013; Diederich and Goeschl, 2014,
2017, 2018), but they do not compare subsidy types.6
3 Experimental design
3.1 Donation appeal
We adapt the real-donation dictator game introduced by Eckel and Grossman
(1996) and subsequently applied to compare subsidy types (Eckel and Gross-
man, 2003; Davis and Millner, 2005; Davis, 2006; Eckel and Grossman, 2006a,b).
In the standard version of the game, subjects decide how much of their money
endowment to hold and how much to pass to a charity. In our variant of the
game, subjects decide how many units of the charitable good to fund at a given
nominal price.
Our variant of the game requires a charitable good or service that is eas-
ily quantifiable. We approached a relief organization, Sign of Hope e.V., which
frequently uses various forms of unit donation schemes in their fundraising cam-
paigns. Among their activities, we chose the treatment of malnourished children
in a certain area of South Sudan as this service offered practical units and prices
for our experiment. The children were treated in two “bush clinics” operated
by the relief organization at the time of the experiment. Treating one child for
one month using a special nutritional paste and high energy cookies requires a
donation of US$15. We divided this number into practical units of nutritional
packages per child and day, which implies a “price” of $0.50 per package.
The donation appeal was part of an online survey and participants used their
6Weakly related to a unit donation scheme are so called ”buy-one give-one” business models
(see e.g. Marquis and Park, 2014; Hamby, 2016) where for each product purchased the selling
company donates a similar product. However, in these models, the donation is tied to the
consumption of a private good. We are not aware of any paper introducing or comparing
subsidies in that context.
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reward for completing the survey ($2) to make any donations. The donation
appeal introduced the charity, the charitable good, and its marginal provision
cost to the charity. We also provided a link to the charity’s web page and
informed subjects about a transparency award the charity had won to increase
trust in the charity (Adena et al., 2019). The final part of the donation appeal
was treatment specific. Table 1 shows the seven treatment conditions. In the
control condition, no subsidy was applied and subjects chose how many packages
to fund at a price of $0.50. The remaining six treatment conditions follow a
3× 2 factorial design with one factor being the subsidy type (rebate, match, or
discount) and the other factor being the effective price ($0.33 or $0.25) implied
by the level of the subsidy. In the instructions, we framed the rebate conditions
as 33% (50%) rebate and stated that while providing packages would cost the
subject $0.50 apiece, a rebate of $0.17 ($0.25) per package would be added to the
subject’s final reward at the end of the experiment. For the matching conditions,
instructions stated that for every two packages (each package) that the subject
provided at a nominal cost of $0.50 apiece, one package would be matched at
no additional cost to the subject. As a result, the charity would receive the
combined number of packages. For the discount conditions, instructions stated
that the subject would be able to provide packages for $0.33 ($0.25) instead
of $0.50 apiece. Hence, the nominal price corresponded to the effective price.
For all subsidy types, instructions noted that the subsidy, i.e. the rebate, the
matched units, or the money needed to reduce the nominal price, was provided
by “a third party.” This was a truthful yet indefinite reference to the research
budget involved. Subjects chose the desired number of packages from a drop-
down menu. The exact wording of each treatment can be found in Table 2.7
7Figure C1 in Appendix C shows a screenshot of the complete donation appeal.
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Table 1: Treatment conditions
Subsidy type Subsidy Nominal Effective N
rate unit price unit price
No subsidy – $0.50 $0.50 83
Rebate 33% $0.50 $0.33 71
Match 1:2 $0.50 $0.33 85
Discount 33% $0.33 $0.33 90
Rebate 50% $0.50 $0.25 58
Match 1:1 $0.50 $0.25 80
Discount 50% $0.25 $0.25 91
Table 2: Final part of donation appeal wording by treatment
Treatment Wording
No subsidy In this survey, you may use all, part, or none of your reward of $2.00 for
this HIT to provide these nutrition packages. Thus, you may choose any
number between 0 and 4 packages. $0.50 per package will be subtracted
from your reward.
33% rebate [Same text as in no subsidy condition]
Upon completion of the survey, a third party has agreed to fund a 33%
rebate for each package you provide. The rebate ($0.17 per package
provided) will be added to your reward.
1:2 match [Same text as in no subsidy condition]
A third party has agreed to match every two packages you provide,
at no additional cost to you. So, for example, if you choose to provide 2
packages, Sign of Hope will receive 3.
33% discount In this survey, you will be able to provide these nutritional packages for
$0.33 apiece (a third party will fund the remaining $0.17). You may
use all, part, or none of your reward of $2.00 for this HIT to provide
packages. Thus, you may choose any number between 0 and 6 packages.
$0.33 per package will be subtracted from your reward.
50% rebate [Same text as in no subsidy condition]
Upon completion of the survey, a third party has agreed to fund a 50%
rebate for each package you provide. The rebate ($0.25 per package
provided) will be added to your reward.
1:1 match [Same text as in no subsidy condition]
A third party has agreed to match each package you provide, at
no additional cost to you. So, for example, if you choose to provide 2
packages, Sign of Hope will receive 4.
50% discount In this survey, you will be able to provide these nutritional packages for
$0.25 apiece (a third party will fund the remaining $0.25). You may
use all, part, or none of your reward of $2.00 for this HIT to provide
packages. Thus, you may choose any number between 0 and 8 packages.
$0.25 per package will be subtracted from your reward.
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3.2 Experimental protocol
We conduct the experiment online recruiting U.S. residents from the online labor
market, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT).8 In the case of money donations,
online field experiments based on AMT (Gandullia and Lezzi, 2018; Gandullia,
2019) and not based on AMT (Bekkers, 2015) have been successfully used to
replicate the superiority of matches over rebates. Gandullia and Lezzi (2018)
and Gandullia (2019) use the same endowment level and subsidy rates as we
do. Our task was posted five times on the MTurk task queue between July and
October 2015, resulting in five online sessions. Interested workers were informed
that they would earn $2 for answering a 20-minutes academic survey on several
topics. The payment is rather high when compared to the average hourly wage
of about $3.1 to $3.5 per worker on AMT (Hara et al., 2018). Each worker was
only able to particpate once. Donations were mentioned as one of the topics,
but the real-donation dictator game was not particularly salient compared to
other survey elements. As a result, it is unlikely that subjects considered the
donation task as the main subject of investigation. Interested workers followed a
link which directed them to the survey containing the experiment on Qualtrics.
Having followed the link to the survey platform, interested workers read and
confirmed an informed consent page about the research study.
The experimental survey consisted of four parts: (1) the donation appeal, (2)
a questionnaire on various topics, (3) a low-stake version of the Eckel-Grossman
risk task (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008a),9 and (4) a 5-item manipulation
8AMT provides several benefits to researchers, among them fast and easy access to sub-
jects, a diverse subject pool, and low costs (Paolacci et al., 2010; Mason and Suri, 2012).
Several papers have examined the suitability of AMT for experimental research and have
found encouraging results (Paolacci et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Mason and Suri, 2012;
Rand, 2012). Results in these papers highlight a high internal consistency of self-reported
demographics, an incentive-compatibility of earnings, and a “spammer”-free workforce from
the built-in reputation system. They also present and review results from successful replica-
tions of standard experimental games in AMT (e.g. Paolacci et al., 2010; Rand, 2012). In
implementing our experiment, we followed the suggestions for researchers in that literature
and the Guidelines for Academic Requesters on AMT (WeAreDynamo, 2014).
9We opt for the Eckel-Grossman Risk Task because of its simplicity and quickness. A
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check questionnaire comparable to Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2006b) and Davis
and Millner (2005). Parts (1) and (2) were presented in random order. Hence,
a subject encountered the donation appeal either before or after the question-
naire. One of the treatment conditions was drawn at random and presented
to the subject (between-subjects design).10 The questionnaire of part (2) con-
sisted of questions on sociodemographics, employment, and religious beliefs, as
well as current ambient environmental conditions and the Ten Item Personal-
ity Inventory (TIPI), which is a standard one-minute version of more extensive
multi-item instruments to assess the Big Five personality dimensions (Gosling
et al., 2003; Ehrhart et al., 2009). After completion of all survey parts, a unique
code was shown that the subject had to enter into the survey task window on
AMT to receive payment.
In total, we have 613 observations of participants starting the survey and
599 completed records. Incomplete records were dropped from the analysis.11
The obvious concern that some subjects may fraudulently use multiple accounts
to participate more than once is generally seen as a minor problem in online
experiments (Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010).12 We nevertheless follow
the common approach to exclude 40 subjects with duplicate Internet Protocol
addresses from the analysis. Including them does not change the results. We
also dropped one subject who indicated an age below 18 in the questionnaire,
despite having confirmed an age above 18 when agreeing to the informed consent
sample of AMT workers is likely to exhibit larger heterogeneity in numeracy than a standard
laboratory sample of students. The Eckel-Grossman task has been shown to produce better
results with people with low mathematical skills (Dave et al., 2010). Stakes start out at $0.28
for the sure option and end up at $0.02 and $0.70 for the most risky gamble.
10A different sample of 113 subjects received the treatment conditions in a within-subjects
(WS) design to investigate how the results differ if individuals are forced to directly compare
different subsidy types. We provide details about the design and the results in Appendix D.
11Among the complete observations, three subjects had restarted the survey and hence
created an incomplete duplicate record. We kept the complete observations of these three
subjects after making sure that they had not encountered a treatment condition in their first
attempt and gave the same answers in the survey.
12In the case of AMT, having multiple accounts is forbidden by Amazon’s Terms of Ser-
vice (Mason and Suri, 2012) and creating an account requires a unique credit card number
(Paolacci et al., 2010).
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statement. This leaves us with a sample of 558 subjects (see Table 1 for the
allocation of subjects across treatments). Average payouts were $1.79 (net of
donations and including an average of $0.30 additional payment for the risk
task). Subjects took on average 8.38 minutes to complete the experiment.
4 Results
Variables elicited in the questionnaire suggest a diverse sample of subjects (see
Table B2 in Appendix B): Slightly less than half of subjects are female, and
slightly less than half graduated from college. About one-third of subjects
are married, and about the same share has children under age 16 living in
the household. Both age and income are well spread, with the median age in
category 26–34 and the median yearly income in category US$40,000–49,999.
Answers to the manipulation check questions indicate that on average, sub-
jects clearly understood instructions and procedures, felt that their anonymity
was preserved, trusted the experimenters and the charity, and found the re-
cipients of the donations worth supporting (Table B2 in Appendix B). Com-
paring the subsamples across treatments using a multivariate analysis of vari-
ance (MANOVA) suggests that randomization into treatments was successful
(p = 0.46 for Pillai’s trace).13
In Table 3, we present descriptive results for donations observed in the ex-
perimental treatments. Panel A reports mean values and standard deviations.
Column 1 shows the average number of nutritional packages that subjects se-
lected to donate in their version of the donation appeal. Hence, column 1 is units
purchased before any rebate or matching subsidy but accounts for subsidized
nominal prices in the discount conditions. If multiplied by the nominal price,
column 1 would correspond to out-of-pocket expenses that are frequently de-
13We exclude the manipulation check items from the list of dependent variables due to
potential endogeneity. A separate MANOVA of the manipulation check questions does not
indicate significant differences, and including them does not result in a lower p-value.
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noted as “checkbook giving” in standard money donation experiments. Column
2 reports individual net donations in dollars that result from subjects’ choices
after all subsidies are accounted for. That is, column 2 is column 1 evaluated
at the (discounted) nominal price minus any rebates. Column 3 refers to the
mean number of nutritional packages the charity “receives”, based on subjects’
choices, that is, column 1 plus any matched packages. If we multiplied column
3 by $0.50 for all treatments, we would obtain gross charity receipts in dollars,
a common focus in money donation experiments. Because of perfect collinear-
ity of both receipts measures, we will only use column 3 as charity receipts in
the following analysis. Columns 4 and 5 show the intensive and the extensive
margin of giving, respectively. Column 4 reports mean charity receipts condi-
tional on being a donor while column 5 reports the fraction of donors. For each
variable, panels B to D report p-values of pairwise comparison tests between
treatments.
4.1 Rebates versus matches
Focusing on the comparison of rebates and matches first, three main results
follow from columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.
Result 1 (Charity receipts) Charity receipts do not significantly differ between
rebate and matching subsidies.
Column 3 shows that the charity received an average of about 1.7 (1.9) units per
subject in the 33% (50%) rebate condition and about 1.5 (2.2) units per subject
in the 1:2 (1:1) matching condition. At both effective prices, the levels of charity
receipts do not significantly differ between the two subsidy types (p = 0.52 and
p = 0.41).
Result 2 (Net donations) There is no evidence for crowding-in or crowding-out
of net donations by rebate or matching subsidies of any level.
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Table 3: Descriptive results
Treatments Donation variable
Condition Nominal Effective Indivi- Net Charity Charity Prob.
unit unit dual dona- receipt, receipt, of
price price choice tion uncond. cond. dona-
($) ($) (units) ($) (units) (units) tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Mean values (S.D.)
No subsidy 0.50 0.50 1.169 0.584 1.169 2.256 0.518
(1.413) (0.706) (1.413) (1.177) (0.503)
33% rebate 0.50 0.33 1.690 0.558 1.690 2.400 0.704
(1.545) (0.510) (1.545) (1.294) (0.460)
1:2 match 0.50 0.33 1.059 0.529 1.506 3.048 0.494
(1.339) (0.670) (2.021) (1.886) (0.503)
33% discount 0.33 0.33 1.478 0.488 1.478 2.771 0.533
(1.973) (0.651) (1.973) 1.927 (0.502)
50% rebate 0.50 0.25 1.931 0.483 1.931 2.732 0.707
(1.705) (0.426) (1.705) (1.379) (0.459)
1:1 match 0.50 0.25 1.113 0.556 2.225 3.787 0.588
(1.253) (0.626) (2.506) (2.176) (0.495)
50% discount 0.25 0.25 2.143 0.536 2.143 3.545 0.604
(2.831) (0.708) (2.831) (2.879) (0.492)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.01 0.76 0.52 0.06 0.01
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.27 0.03
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.10 0.68 0.93 0.49 0.60
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.01 0.15
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.07 0.20
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.00 0.84 0.84 0.63 0.82
C. Tests of subsidized prices: p-values
50% vs. 33% rebate 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.24 0.97
1:1 vs. 1:2 match 0.79 0.79 0.05 0.09 0.23
50% vs. 33% discount 0.07 0.64 0.07 0.11 0.34
D. Tests of subsidized vs. unsubsidized price: p-values
33% rebate vs. no subsidy 0.03 0.79 0.03 0.58 0.02
1:2 match vs. no subsidy 0.61 0.61 0.21 0.02 0.76
33% discount vs. no subsidy 0.24 0.35 0.24 0.12 0.84
Panel A shows mean values of the donation variables for each treatment (standard deviations in parentheses).
Column 1 reports the number of packages that subjects selected to give at the nominal price. Column 2 shows
the net dollar contribution implied by subjects’ choices, i.e., column 1 evaluated at the nominal price minus
the rebate (if any). Column 3 reports the overall number of packages received by the charity, i.e., column
1 plus matched units (if any). Column 4 reports the same measure as column 3 but conditional on giving
(intensive margin). Column 5 reports the share of subjects who donated at least one package (extensive
margin). Panels B to D show pairwise tests between treatment conditions. Panel B compares subsidy types
conditional on the effective price. Panel C compares the two subsidized prices, $0.25 and $0.33, conditional
on subsidy type. Panel D compares the unsubsidized price with the subsidized price arising from the low
subsidy rate for each subsidy type. Columns 1 to 4 in panels B to D report p-values of two-tailed t-tests with
unequal variances. Column 5 report p-values of a Pearson χ2 tests for binary data.
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Column 2 indicates that net donations exhibit a roughly constant share of
around one quarter of the endowment across all treatment conditions. Nei-
ther the introduction of a subsidy at any rate nor an increase in the subsidy
rate results in significant changes.
To achieve the same level of charity receipts and net donations, subjects need
to select more units to donate under a rebate than under a match (since the
match is paid on top of the units selected). This is exactly what we observe
in column 1: The average number of units selected is at least 0.5 units larger
(p ≤ 0.01 at both effective prices).
Result 3 (Law of demand) Charity receipts significantly decrease in the price.
Column 3 shows that charity receipts significantly increase in the subsidy level,
either from introducing the subsidy (p = 0.03 in case of the rebate) or from
increasing the subsidy rate (p = 0.05 in case of the match). Given Result 2,
this increase in charity receipts is entirely driven by the additional money that
is provided as subsidy payment by the third party.
The indifference between rebates and matches regarding charity receipts con-
trasts with virtually all previous literature on money donations. The typical
finding there is that charity receipts under matches exceed those under rebates
while “checkbook giving”, which corresponds to column (1) in our setup, would
be roughly the same under both subsidy types. We therefore now examine
whether this indifference remains after controlling for the available covariates.
Consider an individual, i, who decides how many units, gi, of the charita-
ble good to provide. Since the individual has a limited endowment and only
complete units of the good can be provided, the individual faces a discrete and
ordered choice set. For example, subjects who are assigned to the control condi-
tion can give 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 packages. We estimate an Ordered Probit Model with
the individual choice as dependent variable,14 which is subsequently employed
14Whereas a common approach in the literature is to estimate a Tobit Model with the mon-
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to analyze the effect of the different subsidies on the level of charity receipts.
This is possible, since, given a subsidy scheme, the individual choice directly
translates into a level of charity receipts. The advantage of this procedure will
become clear after explaining the model in more detail.
The model is based on a latent variable
g∗i = x
′
iβ + s
′
iγ + εi (1)
where xi is a vector of covariates, including a constant, si is a vector consisting
of a dummy for each subsidy type as well as subsidy type specific dummies
for whether the offered subsidy rate is high and therefore the effective price is
low ($0.25), β and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated and εi is an
i.i.d. standard normally distributed error term. In general, each of the possible
choices an individual can make, gi ∈ {g1, ..., gJ}, is associated with a certain
interval of the latent variable:
gi = g
j if αj−1 < g
∗
i ≤ αj for j = 1, ..., J (2)
where α0 and αJ are set to −∞ and ∞, respectively, α1 = 0 and α2, ...,αJ−1
are threshold parameters to be estimated.
Another specific feature of the experimental design, which we need to account
for in the estimation, is that the choice sets differ across treatments. For subjects
facing a match, rebate, or no subsidy, each selected unit requires an expenditure
of $0.5. Although in case of the rebate, part of this expenditure is refunded,
this refund can not be donated (similar to most money donation experiments).
etary value which the individual has chosen to give, charity receipts, or their logarithmized
value as dependent variable, the discrete nature of our donation decision makes it an unsuit-
able choice to model our data. This is supported by conditional moment tests significantly
rejecting the assumption of normally distributed error terms for the Tobit Model with charity
receipts or logarithmized charity receipts as dependent variable (p < 0.01). We neverthe-
less report the results of different Tobit specifications together with simple OLS results as
robustness checks in Table E4 in Appendix E. Qualitative results do not substantially differ.
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Since the endowment is $2, the maximum number of packages that can be
selected is four in those treatment conditions. In contrast, each unit selected
in the discount treatments requires an expenditure of only $0.33 or $0.25 since
the nominal price per unit is discounted upfront. Therefore, subjects can select
up to six or eight packages, depending on whether the discount rate is low or
high.15
We account for this by adding censoring to the model. Since we do not ob-
serve a choice of seven packages in our data, we cannot include this category in
the model. Furthermore, only a single subject decides to provide five packages.
In our main analysis we treat this subject as if the subject had donated six
packages. Results are similar if we explicitly include the choice category of five
packages or omit the observation (see columns 1 to 4 of Table E3 in Appendix E).
Consequently, the choice sets in the following analysis are gi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8}
for the 50% discount treatment, gi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6} for the 33% discount treat-
ment and gi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} for all other treatments. Table B1 in Appendix B
illustrates how the latent variable translates into a certain choice conditional on
the treatment.
Let gmaxi be the maximum number of packages an individual i can give,
which depends on the treatment the individual is assigned to. The probability
to observe a choice gi from the set {g1, ..., g7} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8} is then given
by
Pr(gi = g
j|xi, si) = {gj < gmaxi }{Φ(αj − x′iβ − s′iγ)
− Φ(αj−1 − x′iβ − s′iγ)}
+ {gj = gmaxi }{1− Φ(αj−1 − x′iβ − s′iγ)}
for j = 1, ..., 7
(3)
The parameters θ = (β, γ,α2,α3,α4,α5,α6) are estimated by maximum likeli-
hood, without and with covariates. The covariates include indicator variables for
15See Table B3 in Appendix B for the detailed choice set of each treatment.
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gender, marital status, whether the individual holds a college degree, whether
children under the age of 16 live in the household, whether the individual is
a registered voter, whether the individual frequently attends religious services,
whether the individual works for a not-for-profit organization, and for task
order. We also include categorical variables for age, income, residential envi-
ronment, and religion as well as scores for the Big Five personality dimensions
and risk preferences. Afterwards, we use the estimated coefficients to calculate
the average marginal effect of each subsidy on charity receipts.16
In Panel A of Table 4, columns 1 and 2, we present the results in the form
of the average marginal effects on charity receipts. For example, offering a 33%
rebate is estimated to increase average charity receipts per individual by about
0.5 packages compared to not offering any subsidy (column 1, Rebate), whereas
increasing the subsidy rate from 33% to 50% has no significant effect in the
case of the rebate (column 1, Rebate × low price). Analogously to Table 3,
the predicted levels of charity receipts are compared pairwise across subsidy
types in Panel B, holding the effective price constant. The estimates confirm
Result 1 and Result 3. We repeat the same exercise for predicted levels of
net donations. In line with Result 2, we neither find significant differences
in net donations between subsidy types at the same effective price nor any
evidence for crowding-in or crowding-out at any conventional significance level
when changing the price of giving due to a specific subsidy type.17
To check for misspecification of the model we use the Lagrange Multiplier test
derived by Glewwe (1997). In both model specifications, the Null of normally
distributed error terms cannot be rejected (p > 0.35 and p > 0.95, without and
16The formulas used to calculate these effects are derived in Appendix A and are based on
the deterministic relationship between the individual choice and charity receipts. Using the
individual choice as dependent variable simplifies the estimation procedure: If the choice sets
of any two treatments differ, one is a subset of the other, and the smaller set is simply censored
from above. Additionally, the selected number of packages represents subjects immediate
choice and therefore is probably the most intuitive concept for modeling the decision process.
17Results are available from the authors upon request.
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with covariates, respectively). We also find little evidence that the results are
substantively affected by allowing for heteroscedasticity.18
Having observed that charity receipts do not differ between rebates and
matches, we ask whether this indifference result masks heterogeneities in the
“conversion rates” of the experimental donation call (the extensive margin of
giving) and the conditional level of charity receipts demanded by donors (the
intensive margin of giving). As discussed in Section 1, rebates decrease the
minimum net expense required to become a donor, making them potentially
more effective at the extensive margin than matches. Indeed, results in column
5 of Table 3 confirm that rebates attract a larger share of donors than matches.
In particular, the differences amount to roughly 21 percentage points (70.4%
vs. 49.4%) and 12 percentage points (70.7% vs. 58.8%) in the case of the high
and the low effective price, respectively. The difference is significant at the high
effective price (p = 0.01) but not at the low effective price (p = 0.15).19 We take
this as evidence that the indifference result for the level of charity receipts is
partly driven by the fact that rebate subsidies are more effective at the extensive
margin.
Result 4 (Extensive margin) Rebates are more effective in attracting donors
18We expand the model in column 2 of Table 4 by modeling the variance as exp(z′iρ).
We estimate this model with different sets of covariates included in zi. Set 1 includes age,
income, gender, whether the individual frequently attends religious services, and task order.
Set 2 additionally contains the Big Five personality dimensions and risk preferences. Set
3 includes all covariates. Only if we use the whole set of covariates to explicitly model
heteroscedasticity the model with homoscedasticity is rejected (p < 0.01). Still, rebates and
matches do not significantly differ in the level of charity receipts at the low subsidy rate,
but matches are now estimated to raise significantly more packages than rebates at the high
subsidy rate. However, one should be careful with taking these results at face value since this
model specification produces some odd results. For example, a 33% discount is estimated
to have a significantly negative impact on charity receipt of almost 0.4 packages, which is in
strong contrast to what we observe in the data. See Table E3 in Appendix E for detailed
results.
19The fact that the difference in the extensive margin is more pronounced for the low
subsidy rate is not surprising, since for the 1:2 match the first unit donated does not result
in a matching payment. Consequently, the minimum expense required to become a donor
is larger than for the equivalent rebate while the impact of the action is the same: a single
nutritional package received by the charity. As a result, not only the costs but also the effective
prices at the margin of becoming a donor differ, further decreasing the relative attractiveness
of the match.
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Table 4: Estimation results
Charity Receipts, Probability Charity Receipts,
unconditional of donation conditional
(units) (binary) (units)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Marginal effects
Rebate 0.546** 0.558** 0.186** 0.229*** 0.091 -0.025
(0.237) (0.256) (0.077) (0.081) (0.256) (0.271)
Match 0.324 0.241 -0.024 -0.008 0.799** 0.478
(0.261) (0.287) (0.077) (0.085) (0.359) (0.391)
Discount 0.306 0.203 0.015 0.012 0.537 0.278
(0.247) (0.271) (0.076) (0.084) (0.332) (0.366)
Rebate × low price 0.218 0.197 0.003 -0.031 0.326 0.343
(0.277) (0.301) (0.081) (0.088) (0.266) (0.279)
Match × low price 0.888** 1.072*** 0.093 0.115 0.783* 0.828*
(0.373) (0.406) (0.077) (0.083) (0.448) (0.469)
Discount × low price 0.585* 0.667* 0.071 0.064 0.571 0.869*
(0.326) (0.365) (0.073) (0.084) (0.448) (0.509)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.43 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.19
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.37 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.40
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.95 0.90 0.60 0.81 0.53 0.65
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.30 0.00 0.01
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.71 0.76 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.08
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.43 0.32 0.82 0.70 0.33 0.76
Covariatesa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood -801.28 -590.10 -372.07 -248.44 -427.37 -314.64
Observations 558 428 558 428 326 256
(1)–(2): Ordered Probit with the number of packages selected by the individual as dependent variable. (3)–(4): Probit for
whether or not a donation was made. (5)–(6): Ordered Probit conditional on being a donor, with the number of packages
selected by the individual as dependent variable. (1)–(2) and (5)–(6) treat a single observation with 5 selected packages as if
it were 6 selected packages.
Panel A presents average marginal effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. For
(1)–(2) and (5)–(6), marginal effects refer to the average change in expected charity receipts over all individuals or donors
only, respectively. For each individual considered, the change is calculated by taking the difference in expected charity receipts
between receiving a particular subsidy at the low rate (rebate, match, discount) and not receiving any subsidy or between
receiving a particular subsidy at the high rate (rebate × low price, match × low price, discount × low price) and receiving the
same subsidy at the low rate.
Panel B presents p-values for the pairwise comparison of treatment effects (subsidy treatment vs. no subsidy) between subsidy
types, based on the average marginal effects.
aCovariates include gender, marital status, the Big Five personality dimensions, risk preferences, categorical variables for age,
income, residential environment, and religion, and dummies for whether the individual holds a college degree, whether children
under the age of 16 live in the household, whether the individual is a registered voter, whether the individual frequently attends
religious services, whether the individual works for a not-for-profit organization and task order. Likelihood ratio tests reject
that their coefficients in model (2), (4) and (6) are jointly zero (p < 0.01, p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively).
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than matches.
Turning to the intensive margin, column 4 of Table 3, shows that conditional
charity receipts under both match conditions significantly exceed the corre-
sponding values in the rebate conditions (3.0 vs. 2.4 units and 3.8 vs. 2.7 units,
respectively; p = 0.06 and p = 0.01).
Result 5 (Intensive margin) Charity receipts per donor are higher under match-
ing than under rebate subsidies.
Comparing matching and rebate treatments in column 4 and 5 of Table 3 to
the control reinforces the view that the channel through which rebates raise
unconditional charity receipts primarily is the extensive margin whereas matches
unfold their impact through the intensive margin. For the rebate, introducing
the low subsidy rate increases the share of donors in column 5 from 51.8% to
70.4% (p = 0.02) compared to the no subsidy condition, while the intensive
margin is not significantly affected (p = 0.58). In contrast, for the match,
introducing the low subsidy rate increases mean conditional charity receipts in
column 4 from 2.3 to 3.0 units (p = 0.02) compared to the no subsidy condition,
while the extensive margin is unaffected (p = 0.76).
Again, we supplement the descriptive results by estimating appropriate para-
metric models. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 refer to a Probit without and with
covariates, respectively, while columns 5 and 6 capture the intensive margin
by estimating an Ordered Probit Model for donors only. The latter is set up
analogously to the Ordered Probit Model described above. If we assumed that
after controlling for observable characteristics, the error terms between the de-
cisions to donate and how much to donate are uncorrelated, we could interpret
these two models jointly as a Two-Part model. The parametric estimation con-
firms results 4 and 5, but for the intensive margin, only the difference between
matches and rebates at the high subsidy rate remains significant when covariates
are included.
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One concern regarding the comparison of rebate and matching subsidies in
our experiment might be that differences in the budget constraints for charity
receipts could drive some of the results. Under a rebate, the highest possible
number of packages received by the charity is always four, since the donor
must fully fund each selected unit at a nominal price of $0.5 before receiving
the refund. In contrast, the matching subsidy applies on top of the selected
packages: If under a 1:1 match a donor decides to spend her whole endowment
of $2 to fund four packages, then the charity receives eight packages.20 Similar
differences apply to almost all laboratory experiments comparing rebates and
matches in the money donation literature, as they also endow subjects with a
limited amount of money. However, in the money donation literature, it is shown
that the higher effectiveness of matches observed in laboratory studies also holds
in field experiments where subjects use their own income (Eckel and Grossman,
2008b, 2017). If the budget constraint mattered in our design, the results could
understate the effectiveness of rebates compared to matches for situations in
which the budget constraint is more loose or non-binding. This implies that
rebates might be even more effective than matches in such situations.
To provide a robustness check on this matter, we revisit Result 1 and Result
5 by recoding subjects’ choices in order to equalize budget constraints. In our
data, a total of 29.5% of subjects give the maximum amount under rebates,
compared to 10.9% in the matching conditions. For each condition, we set all
charity receipts above four packages to four packages (the maximum level of
charity receipts under rebates). Detailed results are presented in Table B4 in
Appendix B. Although rebates now provide the highest average number of pack-
ages received by the charity, the difference to matches is not significant at the
high subsidy rate (p = 0.65) and only marginally significant at the low subsidy
rate (p = 0.09). Hence, Result 1 survives the robustness check. In contrast, the
20See Table B3 in Appendix B for the detailed choice set of each treatment.
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difference on the intensive margin (Result 5) vanishes after censoring charity
receipt at four packages. A possible explanation is that matches create larger
conditional donations only in settings where the budget constraint is binding
for a sufficiently large share of individuals.
4.2 Discount subsidies
Subsidies that put a simple price reduction on nominal prices turn out to be
as effective as rebate and matching subsidies that produce equivalent effective
prices. Charity receipts in column 3 and net donations in column 2 of Table 3 do
not significantly differ from those under the other two subsidy types (p ≥ 0.44
for each comparison). Hence, the increased salience of the effective price under
discounts does not seem to affect demand, and this alternative subsidy type does
not lend itself to a more effective subsidy. Instead, the selected number of units
in column 1 under a discount is statistically indistinguishable from that selected
under a rebate (p = 0.44 and p = 0.57) but by an amount higher than under the
corresponding match (p = 0.10 and p < 0.005) which approximately makes up
for the additional units provided as matching payment. In line with the law of
demand, charity receipts increase in the subsidy level, although only the increase
from the price change from $0.33 to $0.25 is significant (p = 0.07). There is
again no evidence for crowding-in or -out. Our Ordered Probit estimates in
Table 4, columns 1–2, fully confirm these findings.
Result 6 (Discounts) The discount subsidy produces the same level of charity
receipts and net donations as rebates and matches. Increasing the subsidy rate
increases charity receipts, without crowding-in or crowding-out net donations.
Differentiating behavior into the extensive and the intensive margin shows
that, at the low subsidy rate, the likelihood to give under the discount is signif-
icantly lower than under the rebate (column 5 of Table 3 and columns 3–4 of
Table 4). Since we would expect the responses to rebates and discounts to be
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similar at the extensive margin, this difference may hint towards a behavioral
bias in the response to an equivalent decrease in the cost of becoming a donor.
At the intensive margin, there is some marginally significant difference between
discounts and rebates at the high subsidy rate, shown in column 4 of Table 3
and columns 5–6 of Table 4. In comparison to the matching subsidies, there are
neither significant difference at the extensive nor at the intensive margin.
Result 7 (Discounts at the extensive and intensive margin) Discounts are equally
effecitve as matches at both margins. They are significantly less effective in at-
tracting donors than rebates (at the low subsidy rate) and create higher charity
receipts per donor than rebates (at the high subsidy rate).
5 Discussion
In our experiment, we find both equivalence between matches and rebates as
subsidy-based incentives to donors and an equivalence with price discounts. This
equivalence under a unit donation scheme contrasts with the existing literature
that has examined subsidy types under a money donation scheme and has gen-
erally found matches outperforming rebates.21 This includes papers which also
use an online experimental methodology (Bekkers, 2015; Gandullia and Lezzi,
2018; Gandullia, 2019) of which two recruit from the same subject pool and use
similar endowment levels as we do (Gandullia and Lezzi, 2018; Gandullia, 2019).
A closer parallel exists with experimental evidence comparing product promo-
tions in the marketing literature. For private goods, matches (bonus packs) and
price discounts frequently, but not always, perform equally well (Chen et al.,
21We are aware of only one other paper that finds the same level of charity receipts be-
tween rebates and matches, but it does so under a choice architecture that does not resemble
a typical donation decision: In Davis (2006), subjects do not decide how much to donate
(checkbook giving) but how much the charity receives (charity receipts). This choice archi-
tecture, motivated by an investigation of the causal mechanism that underpins the standard
result of non-equivalence, makes it difficult to compare their results with ours.
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2012; Hardesty and Bearden, 2003; Sinha and Smith, 2000).22 For charitable
goods, however, our finding is unusual.
As discussed in Section 2.2, rebates and matches are no longer theoretically
equivalent under a unit donation scheme. When donors face the choice architec-
ture of a unit donation scheme, the minimum net expense required to become
a donor is lower under rebates than under matches. This does not hold for
a money donation scheme. As a result, the behavior on the extensive margin
might be a crucial factor to explain why matches do not outperform rebates in
our setting. In line with this reasoning, our results on the extensive margin differ
from those obtained in the context of money donations schemes. We find that
rebates attract more donors than matches. Bekkers (2015) finds the opposite
by using similar subsidy rates in a standard money donation choice architec-
ture. Furthermore, Gandullia and Lezzi (2018) use the same online population,
subsidy rates, and endowment levels as we do but focus on a standard money
donation scheme. In their experiment, both rebates and matches increase the
fraction of donors compared to a no-subsidy condition and effect sizes between
the different subsidy types are similar.
In our experiment, the minimum positive net donation under a match amounts
to $0.50. Under a 33% (50%) rebate, 25% (22%) of donors give less than $0.50.
Recoding those subjects as non-donors eliminates any significant difference on
the extensive margin, which offers additional evidence that the lower cost of
becoming a donor might drive the results. Matches now lead to higher charity
receipts than rebates (1.506 vs. 1.437 units at the low subsidy rate and 2.225
vs. 1.707 units at the high subsidy rate), yet differences between the two subsidy
types remain statistically insignificant (p = 0.817 and p = 0.167). The impor-
tance of the extensive margin to explain the different results in our setting is
also in line with the finding that unit and money donation schemes produce
22Ex-post rebates tend to perform less well (Sinha and Smith, 2000).
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different behavior on the extensive margin (Diederich et al., 2020).
An interesting question for future research is how the effectiveness of the
different subsidy types under a unit donation scheme depends on the level of
the unsubsidized unit price. At a given subsidy rate, a larger unsubsidized price
increases the absolute difference in the minimum expense required to become a
donor between rebates and matches. As a result, the differences on the extensive
margin might become more pronounced, which in turn might be sufficient to
make the rebate raise more money than the match. In contrast, reducing the
unit size might move results closer to what has been found for money donation
schemes. Future research is also needed to better understand the behavior
under the discount subsidy. In our experiment, discounts are less effective in
attracting donors than rebates despite implying the same costs of becoming
a donor. One speculative reason is that a donor has the feeling of providing
the whole unit herself under the rebate, while she gets the impression of only
providing a fraction of the unit under the discount. In this case, the donor
might derive lower warm glow utility when selecting one unit under the discount
compared to the rebate.
As mentioned earlier, the setting in Kesternich et al. (2016) has some simi-
larities with a unit donation scheme. In the field experiment, clients of a long
distance bus operator decide whether to offset the carbon emissions from their
travel at a given price. Similar to our results, the authors find that rebates of
up to 50% do not affect net donations and are more effective than matches at
the extensive margin. However, in their study matches still outperform rebates
with respect to charity receipts and net donations. Both the binary choice set-
ting and the use of an impure public good might explain these differences to
our results.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we define a class of donations in which donors are asked to choose
the number of discrete units of the charitable good to fund instead of the amount
of money to give. We call the former a unit donation and the latter a money
donation. We present empirical evidence from an online field experiment de-
signed to analyze how different subsidy types affect unit donations. By doing
so we focus on the two prevalent subsidy types, rebates and matches, as well
as a subsidy type which is novel to public good contributions and framed as a
simple price discount. The latter can be applied since for unit donations, each
physical unit has a well-defined price that can be explicitly reduced.
The results remarkably differ from the well-established findings for money
donations. Matching subsidies do not outperform rebates but are equally ef-
fective in raising funds. Yet matching and rebate subsidies create different
responses at the extensive and intensive margin of giving. While rebates signif-
icantly increase the fraction of donors, matches produce larger donations. The
significantly higher likelihood to give under rebates compared to matches is in
contrast to the money donation literature and appears to be one reason why
rebates catch up with matches in the unit donation setting of our experiment.
Price discounts raise similar levels of funds as rebates and matches. None of the
subsidy types significantly affects net donations.
Our results underline the relevance of the decision environment when solic-
iting donations and, thus, have important implications for practitioners. First,
charities that employ unit donations in their fundraising efforts cannot rely on
the insights from the existing literature on subsidizing money donations. Sec-
ond, whether it is useful to apply a certain type of subsidy to unit donations
depends on a charitys objectives. Previous research has shown that individuals
that donated once are more likely to give in the future. If the charity desires
to maximize the set of donors, our evidence suggests that a rebate is prefer-
30
able over a match. If the charity instead seeks to maximize charity receipts,
the choice of the subsidy type seems to be irrelevant, offering some additional
degrees of freedom to charities in their campaign design. Third, in cases where
funds are not tied to being used as a subsidy, subsidizing unit donations is not
necessarily beneficial as on the aggregate it may not crowd in private giving.
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Appendix A (For online publication) Deriva-
tion of marginal effects
To explain the calculation of the average marginal effects we first explicitly write
si in equation (1) as
si =
!
""""""""""""""#
rebatei
matchi
discounti
rebatei × low pricei
matchi × low pricei
discounti × lowpricei
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
,
where rebatei, matchi, and discounti are dummies for whether individual i
faces a particular subsidy type, rebatei × low pricei, matchi × low pricei, and
discounti × lowpricei are subsidy type specific dummies indicating whether
the subsidy rate is high and the effective price is low ($0.25).
We use the estimated parameters θ̂ and the deterministic relationship be-
tween the selected number of packages (individual choice), gi, and charity re-
ceipts, cri, to calculate the expected level of charity receipts, Êi, predicted by
the model for each individual under each treatment condition. For example, to
receive individual i’s expected level of charity receipts under the 50% rebate we
set si,r25 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
′ – the subscript r25 indicates the subsidy type and
the implied effective price in cents – and calculate the predicted value of the
latent variable according to equation (1):
ĝ∗i,r25 = x
′
iβ̂ + s
′
i,r25γ̂
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Afterwards we estimate the expected level of charity receipts by
Êi,r25 =
8'
k=0
kP̂ (cri = k|xi, si = si,r25) =
4'
k=0
kP̂ (gi = k|xi, si = si,r25)
= 4− Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,r25)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,r25)− Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,r25)− Φ(−ĝ∗i,r25)
where P̂ (cri = k|xi, si = si,r25) = 0 for k > 4 since the maximum level of
charity receipts under the rebate is four. The second equality then follows from
the fact that for all treatment conditions except matches the individual choice
(in physical units) is equal to the level of charity receipts (in physical units).
The last equality follows from using equation (3) to calculate P̂ (yi = k|xi, si =
si,r25). The expected levels of charity receipts for the other six conditions (no
subsidy, 33% rebate, 1:2 match, 1:1 match, 33% discount, and 50% discount)
are accordingly calculated as
Êi,n50 = 4− Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,n50)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,n50)− Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,n50)− Φ(−ĝ∗i,n50)
Êi,r33 = 4− Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,r33)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,r33)− Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,r33)− Φ(−ĝ∗i,r33)
Êi,m33 = 6− 2Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,m33)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,m33)− 2Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,m33)− Φ(−ĝ∗i,m33)
Êi,m25 = 8− 2Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,m25)− 2Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,m25)− 2Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,m25)− 2Φ(−ĝ∗i,m25)
Êi,d33 = 6− 2Φ(â5 − ĝ∗i,d33)− Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,d33)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,d33)− Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,d33)
− Φ(−ĝ∗i,d33)
Êi,d25 = 8− 2Φ(â6 − ĝ∗i,d25)− 2Φ(â5 − ĝ∗i,d25)− Φ(â4 − ĝ∗i,d25)− Φ(â3 − ĝ∗i,d25)
− Φ(â2 − ĝ∗i,d25)− Φ(−ĝ∗i,d25)
We use the expected level of charity receipts to calculate average marginal
effects (AMEs) for introducing a subsidy type at the low rate (rebate, match,
discount) and for changing the subsidy rate for a specific subsidy type from low
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to high (rebate × low price, match × low price, discount × low price):
AMErebate =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,r33 − Êi,n50
AMEmatch =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,m33 − Êi,n50
AMEdiscount =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,d33 − Êi,n50
AMErebate × low price =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,r25 − Êi,r33
AMEmatch × low price =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,m25 − Êi,m33
AMEdiscount × low price =
1
N
N'
i=1
Êi,d25 − Êi,d33
These average marginal effects are presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 4.
Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
Appendix B (For online publication) Additional
figures and tables
Table B1: Latent variable and individual choice
Individual choice (gi) in ...
Latent no subsidy control, 33% discount 50% discount
variabel 33% rebate, 1:2 match,
g∗i 50% rebate, 1:1 match
(−∞, 0] 0 0 0
(0,α2] 1 1 1
(α2,α3] 2 2 2
(α3,α4] 3 3 3
(α4,α5] 4 4 4
(α5,α6] 4 6 6
(α6,∞) 4 6 8
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Table B3: Choice set by treatment
Treatment Individual Corresponding Corresponding
choice net donations charity receipts
[units] [$] [units]
No subsidy 0 0 0
1 0.5 1
2 1 2
3 1.5 3
4 2 4
33% rebate 0 0 0
1 0.33 1
2 0.66 2
3 0.99 3
4 1.32 4
1:2 match 0 0 0
1 0.5 1
2 1 3
3 1.5 4
4 2 6
33% discount 0 0 0
1 0.33 1
2 0.66 2
3 0.99 3
4 1.32 4
5 1.65 5
6 1.98 6
50% rebate 0 0 0
1 0.25 1
2 0.5 2
3 0.75 3
4 1 4
1:1 match 0 0 0
1 0.5 2
2 1 4
3 1.5 6
4 2 8
50% discount 0 0 0
1 0.25 1
2 0.5 2
3 0.75 3
4 1 4
5 1.25 5
6 1.5 6
7 1.75 7
8 2 8
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Table B4: Robustness check for charity receipts censored at 4 packages
Treatment Charity receipts
unconditional conditional
(units) (units)
(1) (2)
A. Mean values (S.D.)
No subsidy 1.169 2.256
(1.413) (1.177)
33% rebate 1.690 2.400
(1.545) (1.294)
1:2 match 1.271 2.571
(1.538) (1.192)
33% discount 1.233 2.313
(1.446) (1.188)
50% rebate 1.931 2.732
(1.705) (1.379)
1:1 match 1.800 3.064
(1.702) (1.009)
50% discount 1.495 2.473
(1.615) (1.372)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.09 0.51
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.06 0.73
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.87 0.31
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.65 0.21
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.12 0.36
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.23 0.01
C. Tests of subsidized prices: p-values
50% vs. 33% rebate 0.41 0.24
1:1 vs. 1:2 match 0.04 0.04
50% vs. 33% discount 0.25 0.53
D. Tests of subsidized vs. unsubsidized price: p-values
33% rebate vs. no subsidy 0.03 0.58
1:2 match vs. no subsidy 0.66 0.22
33% discount vs. no subsidy 0.77 0.82
Panel A shows mean values of the donation variables for each treatment
(standard deviations in parentheses). Column 1 shows unconditional
charity receipts with each number of packages above four recoded to
four. Column 2 shows the corresponding numbers for charity receipts
conditional on being a donor. Shown in panels B and C are p-values of
two-tailed t-tests with unequal variances.
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Appendix C (For online publication) Instruc-
tions
Figure C1: Example donation appeal, 50% discount treatment. The final para-
graph differed between treatments.
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Appendix D (For online publication) Within-
subjects design
If the results of the within-subjects (WS) design mirrored the results of the
between-subjects (BS) design, the WS variation could be used to learn more
about how those results come about. However, as we will show, the results
of the WS design substantially differ. Although under these circumstances we
rank the external validity of the BS design higher, the WS data can provide
insights into subjects’ decision process when they are forced to compare different
conditions.
In the experiment, 146 subjects were randomly assigned to the WS treatment
in which all seven treatment conditions were jointly displayed on the donation
call page in random order (Figure D1). Instructions informed subjects that
one of the conditions would be randomly selected through a lottery and imple-
mented. Subjects then entered, for each condition, an integer number indicating
their desired number of units. 113 subjects completed this treatment. 27 of 33
incomplete observations had missing entries only in one or several of the dona-
tion conditions but were complete otherwise. Taking a conservative approach,
we also drop these in the following analysis. Interpreting them as zeros and
including them does not change the main results.
Table D1 shows summary statistics of the sample in the WS design. Using a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to compare this sample to the one
that was assigned to the BS design suggests that randomization into designs
was successful (p = 0.44).
Table D2 presents the main results analogously to Table 3. Beginning with
the unconditional level of charity receipts in column 3, we observe that under a
WS design, matches and discounts are more effective in providing the charitable
good than rebates. This finding is most pronounced for the low price of $0.25.
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Figure D1: Donation appeal in the WS design
46
Table D1: Summary statistics for BS sample, WS sample, and combined sample
Variable Combined sample BS sample WS sample
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Female 0.48 0.50 671 0.48 0.50 558 0.46 0.50 113
Age (years):
18–25 0.25 0.43 671 0.25 0.44 558 0.21 0.41 113
26–34 0.38 0.49 671 0.37 0.48 558 0.43 0.50 113
35–54 0.29 0.45 671 0.29 0.46 558 0.27 0.45 113
55–64 0.07 0.25 671 0.06 0.25 558 0.07 0.26 113
>65 0.01 0.12 671 0.01 0.12 558 0.01 0.09 113
Married 0.33 0.47 667 0.34 0.47 554 0.27 0.45 113
Childrena 0.30 0.46 671 0.30 0.46 558 0.26 0.44 113
College degree 0.48 0.50 670 0.47 0.50 558 0.54 0.50 112
Incomeb (US$):
<10,000 0.09 0.28 649 0.09 0.28 540 0.07 0.26 109
10,000–19,999 0.11 0.31 649 0.11 0.31 540 0.11 0.31 109
20,000–29,999 0.12 0.33 649 0.12 0.33 540 0.14 0.35 109
30,000–39,999 0.13 0.34 649 0.11 0.32 540 0.20 0.40 109
40,000–49,999 0.15 0.35 649 0.15 0.35 540 0.15 0.36 109
50,000–74,999 0.20 0.40 649 0.21 0.41 540 0.12 0.33 109
75,000–99,999 0.09 0.29 649 0.09 0.28 540 0.09 0.29 109
100,000–150,000 0.10 0.30 649 0.10 0.30 540 0.10 0.30 109
>150,000 0.02 0.15 649 0.02 0.15 540 0.02 0.13 109
Residential environment:
Rural 0.20 0.40 671 0.20 0.40 558 0.19 0.39 113
Suburban 0.52 0.50 671 0.51 0.50 558 0.54 0.50 113
Urban 0.29 0.45 671 0.29 0.45 558 0.27 0.45 113
Registered voter 0.87 0.34 663 0.86 0.34 552 0.88 0.32 111
Not-for-profitc 0.05 0.22 671 0.06 0.23 558 0.03 0.16 113
Religiousd 0.13 0.34 659 0.13 0.34 548 0.14 0.34 111
Religion:
Atheist 0.37 0.48 643 0.38 0.49 533 0.36 0.48 110
Agostic 0.09 0.28 643 0.08 0.28 533 0.10 0.30 110
Roman-Catholic 0.12 0.32 643 0.12 0.32 533 0.14 0.34 110
Protestant 0.18 0.38 643 0.18 0.38 533 0.17 0.38 110
Other Christian 0.12 0.33 643 0.12 0.33 533 0.12 0.32 110
Other Religion 0.12 0.33 643 0.13 0.33 533 0.11 0.31 110
Task ordere 0.51 0.50 671 0.52 0.50 558 0.46 0.50 113
Big Five (scale 1–7):
Extraversion 3.21 1.62 626 3.18 1.60 520 3.32 1.73 106
Agreeableness 5.02 1.23 628 5.04 1.24 523 4.91 1.20 105
Conscientiousness 5.11 1.29 630 5.13 1.30 525 4.97 1.24 105
Emotional stability 4.65 1.52 638 4.62 1.53 531 4.79 1.49 107
Openness 4.70 1.29 640 4.67 1.29 532 4.83 1.32 108
Risk pref. (scale 1–6) 4.00 1.79 667 4.06 1.78 554 3.65 1.79 113
Manipulation check questions (scale 1-5):
Clarityf 4.56 0.68 663 4.58 0.67 551 4.46 0.70 112
Anonymityg 4.48 0.73 663 4.49 0.72 551 4.43 0.78 112
Trust experimenth 4.04 0.93 660 4.04 0.93 549 4.01 0.93 111
Trust charityi 4.13 0.90 662 4.13 0.90 550 4.13 0.92 112
Deserving recipientsj 4.47 0.81 661 4.48 0.82 549 4.42 0.79 112
aHas children under age 16 living in household. bHousehold income. cWorks for a not-for-profit organi-
zation. dFrequently attends religious services. e1 if the subject encountered the donation task after the
questionnaire, 0 if before. f“The instructions, questions, and tasks in this survey were clear and easy to
understand”. g“The procedures followed in this experiment preserved your anonymity”. h“The money you
donated to the charity will be given to the charity”. i“The charity will use the money to provide the chosen
number of nutrition packages”. j“The recipients of the donations are deserving of support”.
Potentially, the discontinuities in the match—the first and third unit funded
not resulting in an additional matched unit—discourage giving at the effective
price of $0.33. For net donations, we observe in column 2 that introducing
matches and discounts significantly crowds in net donations while an increase
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in the rebate rate induces crowding-out.
At first glance the discrepancy in results compared to the BS sample might
come as a surprise, but a closer look at the extensive and intensive margins
in columns 4 and 5 offers a simple explanation for most differences. Unlike
in the BS design, we find that for a given effective price, subsidies are equally
successful in attracting donors at the extensive margin (see also Figure E2). We
speculate that under a WS design, subjects may not decide whether to donate
for each subsidy separately, but rather make a single participation choice across
all subsidies with a similar rate and then respond to the subsidy type mostly at
the intensive margin. In contrast, the introduction of a subsidy and the height
of its rate seems to be highly relevant for the participation decision, regardless
of its type. This response behavior is very different from the one observed in the
BS design and likely to be affected by demand effects from “nudging” subjects
to compare options in the WS design (Charness et al., 2012). We therefore
follow the literature and ascribe higher external validity to the results in the
between-subjects design.
48
Table D2: Descriptive results, within-subject design
Treatments Donation variable
Condition Nominal Effective Indivi- Net Charity Charity Prob.
unit unit dual dona- receipt, receipt, of
price price choice tion uncond. cond. dona-
($) ($) (units) ($) (units) (units) tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Mean values (S.D.)
No subsidy 0.50 0.50 0.558 0.279 0.558 1.750 0.319
(1.026) (0.513) (1.026) (1.105) (0.468)
33% rebate 0.50 0.33 0.867 0.286 0.867 2.130 0.407
(1.278) (0.422) (1.278) (1.147) (0.493)
1:2 match 0.50 0.33 0.699 0.350 0.965 2.535 0.381
(1.085) (0.542) (1.614) (1.695) (0.488)
33% discount 0.33 0.33 0.982 0.324 0.982 2.362 0.416
(1.547) (0.510) (1.547) (1.580) (0.495)
50% rebate 0.50 0.25 0.991 0.248 0.991 2.196 0.451
(1.373) (0.343) (1.373) (1.233) (0.500)
1:1 match 0.50 0.25 0.805 0.403 1.611 3.434 0.469
(1.109) (0.554) (2.218) (2.052) (0.501)
50% discount 0.25 0.25 1.363 0.341 1.363 2.906 0.469
(1.996) (0.499) (1.996) (2.003) (0.501)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.32
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.42 0.56
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.00 0.25 0.80 0.62 0.16
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.59
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.18 1.00
C. Tests of subsidized prices: p-values
50% vs. 33% rebate 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.79 0.10
1:1 vs. 1:2 match 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.01
50% vs. 33% discount 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.06
D. Tests of subsidized vs. unsubsidized price: p-values
33% rebate vs. no subsidy 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.13 0.00
1:2 match vs. no subsidy 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
33% discount vs. no subsidy 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00
Panel A shows mean values of the donation variables for each treatment (standard deviations in paren-
theses). Column 1 reports the number of packages that subjects selected to give at the nominal price.
Column 2 shows the net dollar contribution implied by subjects’ choices, i.e., column 1 evaluated at the
nominal price minus the rebate (if any). Column 3 reports the overall number of packages received by
the charity, i.e., column 1 plus matched units (if any). Column 4 reports the same measure as column
3 but conditional on giving (intensive margin). Column 5 reports the share of subjects who donated at
least one package (extensive margin). Panels B to D show pairwise tests between treatment conditions.
Panel B compares subsidy types conditional on the effective price. Panel C compares the two subsidized
prices, $0.25 and $0.33, conditional on subsidy type. Panel D compares the unsubsidized price with the
subsidized price arising from the low subsidy rate for each subsidy type. In panels B to D, columns 1
to 3 report p-values of two-tailed paired t-tests, column 4 reports p-values of two-tailed unpaired t-tests
with unequal variances, and column 5 reports p-values of McNemar’s χ2 tests for paired binary data.
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Appendix E (Not for publication) Additional
figures and tables
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Figure E1: Distribution of charity receipts (between-subjects design)
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Figure E2: Distribution of charity receipts (within-subjects design)
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Table E1: Nonparametric test results
Comparison Donation variable
Indivi- Net Charity Charity Prob.
dual dona- receipt, receipt, of
choice tion uncond. cond. dona-
(units) ($) (units) (units) tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.28 0.01
[0.01] [0.24] [0.08] [0.32] [0.02]
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.72 0.03
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.74] [0.06]
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.38 0.47 0.90 0.34 0.61
[0.42] [0.51] [0.91] [0.38] [0.66]
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.01 0.89 0.89 0.03 0.15
[0.01] [0.89] [0.89] [0.04] [0.24]
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.65 0.20
[0.41] [0.41] [0.41] [0.68] [0.30]
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.82
[0.22] [0.53] [0.53] [0.08] [0.85]
C. Tests of subsidized prices: p-values
50% vs. 33% rebate 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.25 0.97
[0.51] [0.39] [0.51] [0.29] [0.98]
1:1 vs. 1:2 match 0.53 0.53 0.07 0.08 0.23
[0.56] [0.56] [0.09] [0.12] [0.30]
50% vs. 33% discount 0.22 0.61 0.22 0.41 0.34
[0.24] [0.63] [0.24] [0.43] [0.41]
D. Tests of subsidized vs. unsubsidized price: p-values
33% rebate vs. no subsidy 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.70 0.02
[0.03] [0.54] [0.03] [0.72] [0.05]
1:2 match vs. no subsidy 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.11 0.76
[0.69] [0.69] [0.78] [0.15] [0.79]
33% discount vs. no subsidy 0.66 0.27 0.66 0.51 0.84
[0.68] [0.31] [0.68] [0.53] [0.86]
Panels B to D show p-values of two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests analogously to Table 3. p-values
of two-tailed robust rank order tests are reported in square brackets. Panel B compares subsidy
types conditional on the effective price. Panel C compares the two subsidized prices, $0.25 and
$0.33, conditional on subsidy type. Panel D compares the unsubsidized price with the subsidized
price arising from the low subsidy rate for each subsidy type. Column 1 reports the number
of packages that subjects selected to give at the nominal price. Column 2 shows the net dollar
contribution implied by subjects’ choices, i.e., column 1 evaluated at the nominal price minus
the rebate (if any). Column 3 reports the overall number of packages received by the charity,
i.e., column 1 plus matched units (if any). Column 4 reports the same measure as column 3 but
conditional on giving (intensive margin). Column 5 reports the share of subjects who donated
at least one package (extensive margin).
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Table E2: Complete estimation results
Individual Probability Individual
choice of donation choice
(units) (binary) (units)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rebate 0.408* 0.455* 0.491* 0.710** 0.083 -0.025
(0.178) (0.210) (0.209) (0.263) (0.231) (0.276)
Match -0.075 -0.147 -0.060 -0.023 -0.071 -0.335
(0.173) (0.211) (0.193) (0.247) (0.239) (0.299)
Discount 0.053 -0.015 0.038 0.035 0.040 -0.158
(0.170) (0.206) (0.191) (0.243) (0.231) (0.291)
Rebate × low price 0.152 0.151 0.008 -0.106 0.292 0.350
(0.194) (0.231) (0.234) (0.302) (0.240) (0.287)
Match × low price 0.097 0.193 0.236 0.338 -0.265 -0.265
(0.173) (0.207) (0.196) (0.246) (0.237) (0.293)
Discount × low price 0.175 0.254 0.181 0.188 0.060 0.255
(0.164) (0.205) (0.188) (0.246) (0.218) (0.282)
Female 0.377** 0.350* 0.362*
(0.123) (0.147) (0.167)
Age:
26–34 0.128 0.105 0.259
(0.159) (0.190) (0.223)
35–54 0.245 0.186 0.373
(0.170) (0.205) (0.238)
55–64 0.350 0.358 0.449
(0.250) (0.307) (0.333)
≥ 65 1.211** 1.565* 0.843
(0.422) (0.651) (0.489)
Married -0.109 -0.179 0.059
(0.147) (0.178) (0.198)
Children 0.051 0.206 -0.257
(0.135) (0.163) (0.189)
College degree 0.062 0.198 -0.183
(0.123) (0.150) (0.162)
Income ($):
10,000–19,999 -0.110 0.166 -0.563
(0.271) (0.317) (0.382)
20,000–29,999 -0.295 -0.136 -0.326
(0.256) (0.299) (0.361)
30,000–39,999 -0.160 0.065 -0.418
(0.261) (0.309) (0.352)
40,000–49,999 0.318 0.655* -0.232
(0.245) (0.300) (0.315)
50,000–74,999 0.057 0.178 -0.071
(0.239) (0.281) (0.324)
75,000–99,999 0.310 0.763* -0.262
(0.281) (0.347) (0.370)
100,000–150,00 0.385 0.506 0.066
(0.273) (0.331) (0.356)
> 150, 000 -0.048 -0.034 -0.051
(0.419) (0.478) (0.592)
Residential environment:
Suburban -0.036 -0.041 0.014
(0.156) (0.192) (0.204)
Urban -0.068 -0.101 -0.017
(0.174) (0.212) (0.230)
Registered voter -0.342* -0.594** 0.098
(0.169) (0.221) (0.214)
Not-for-profit 0.404 0.116 0.955**
(0.228) (0.275) (0.311)
Religious 0.157 0.223 0.020
(0.195) (0.241) (0.257)
Religion:
Agostic 0.247 0.368 -0.258
(0.217) (0.273) (0.288)
continued on the next page . . .
52
. . . continued
Roman-Catholic 0.245 0.546* -0.228
(0.191) (0.244) (0.242)
Protestant 0.478* 0.455 0.429
(0.203) (0.247) (0.268)
Other Christian 0.103 -0.017 0.240
(0.193) (0.230) (0.273)
Other Religion 0.068 0.083 0.060
(0.201) (0.238) (0.287)
Task order -0.234* -0.222 -0.149
(0.115) (0.138) (0.159)
Risk pref. 0.018 -0.020 0.078
(0.033) (0.039) (0.047)
Big Five:
Extraversion -0.054 -0.057 -0.088
(0.039) (0.048) (0.055)
Agreeableness -0.017 0.029 -0.121
(0.051) (0.061) (0.073)
Conscientiousness -0.039 0.028 -0.157*
(0.050) (0.060) (0.073)
Emotional stability -0.033 -0.131* 0.184**
(0.045) (0.055) (0.062)
Openness 0.100* 0.102 0.149*
(0.050) (0.061) (0.071)
Constant 0.070 0.075 0.045 -0.007 0.331 0.143
(0.125) (0.486) (0.138) (0.580) (0.172) (0.679)
α1 0.550*** 0.607***
(0.046) (0.057)
α2 1.012*** 1.129*** 0.686*** 0.790***
(0.061) (0.076) (0.066) (0.084)
α3 1.146*** 1.299*** 0.859*** 1.017***
(0.065) (0.082) (0.073) (0.094)
α4 1.298*** 1.466*** 1.055*** 1.256***
(0.083) (0.106) (0.099) (0.135)
α5 1.384*** 1.594*** 1.160*** 1.428***
(0.100) (0.135) (0.120) (0.174)
Log likelihood -801.28 -590.10 -372.07 -248.44 -427.37 -314.64
Observations 558 428 558 428 326 256
This table presents the complete estimation resutlts which are used to calculate the average marginal effects
presented in Table 4.
(1)–(2): Ordered Probit with the number of packages selected by the individual as dependent variable. (3)–(4):
Probit for whether or not a donation was made. (5)–(6): Ordered Probit conditional on being a donor, with
the number of packages selected by the individual as dependent variable. (1)–(2) and (5)–(6) treat a single
observation with 5 selected packages as if it were 6 selected packages.
Standard errors reported in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table E3: Robustness checks – Ordered Probit
Omit Include Heteroscedasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Marginal effects
Rebate 0.546** 0.558** 0.546** 0.561** 0.605** 0.616** 0.343*
(0.237) (0.254) (0.237) (0.255) (0.254) (0.244) (0.209)
Match 0.323 0.242 0.324 0.242 0.28 0.286 0.154
(0.261) (0.285) (0.261) (0.285) (0.303) (0.316) (0.212)
Discount 0.304 0.191 0.306 0.199 0.248 0.178 -0.39**
(0.247) (0.269) (0.247) (0.27) (0.313) (0.3) (0.184)
Rebate × low price 0.218 0.174 0.218 0.183 0.003 0.046 -0.117
(0.277) (0.298) (0.277) (0.298) (0.312) (0.293) (0.236)
Match × low price 0.887** 1.062*** 0.888** 1.067*** 0.983** 0.849** 0.709**
(0.372) (0.404) (0.373) (0.405) (0.41) (0.404) (0.3)
Discount × low price 0.556* 0.619* 0.581* 0.667* 0.55 0.443 0.883***
(0.326) (0.363) (0.326) (0.364) (0.393) (0.377) (0.229)
B. Tests of subsidy types: p-values
B1. At effective price of $0.33
33% rebate vs. 1:2 match 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.40
33% rebate vs. 33% discount 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.00
1:2 match vs. 33% discount 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.74 0.00
B2. At effective price of $0.25
50% rebate vs. 1:1 match 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.02
50% rebate vs. 50% discount 0.78 0.83 0.72 0.74 0.65 0.92 0.30
1:1 match vs. 50% discount 0.38 0.26 0.42 0.32 0.30 0.22 0.17
Covariatesa No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Heteroscedasticity No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -797.07 -585.76 -803.24 -592.06 -584.09 -575.30 -554.95
Observations 557 427 558 428 428 428 428
Each column refers to the estimation of an Ordered Probit Model with the number of packages selected by the individual as
dependent variable. (1)–(2) omit the observation with 5 selected packages. (3)–(4) explicitly include the possibility to give
5 packages in the model. (5)–(7) expand the main model by heteroscedasticty. The variance is modeled as exp(z′iρ) where
zi does not include a constant. In (5) zi includes age, income, gender, whether the individual frequently attends religious
services, and task order, in (6) it includes all covariates but the Big Five and risk preferences, and in (7) it includes all
covariates. Using a likelihood ratio test the main model with homoscedasticity is not rejected when compared to (5) or (6),
but is rejected when compared to (7), p < 0.01.
Panel A presents average marginal effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. For
(1)–(2) and (5)–(6) marginal effects refer to the average change in expected charity receipts over all individuals or donors only,
respectively. For each individual considered, the change is calculated by taking the difference in expected charity receipts
between receiving a particular subsidy at the low rate (rebate, match, discount) and not receiving any subsidy or between
receiving a particular subsidy at the high rate (rebate × low price, match × low price, discount × low price) and receiving
the same subsidy at the low rate.
Panel B presents p-values for the pairwise comparison of treatment effects (subsidy treatment vs. no subsidy) between subsidy
types, based on the average marginal effects.
aCovariates include gender, marital status, the Big Five personality dimensions, risk preferences, categorical variables for age,
income, residential environment, and religion, and dummies for whether the individual holds a college degree, whether children
under the age of 16 live in the household, whether the individual is a registered voter, whether the individual frequently attends
religious services, whether the individual works for a not-for-profit organization and task order. Likelihood ratio tests reject
that their coefficients in model (2), (4) and (6) are jointly zero (p < 0.01, p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively).
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Table E4: Robustness Checks – OLS and Tobit
OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rebate 0.513* 0.64** 0.568** 0.61** 0.585** 0.648**
(0.29) (0.267) (0.259) (0.277) (0.241) (0.257)
Match 0.207 0.001 0.322 0.252 0.038 0.006
(0.332) (0.286) (0.276) (0.3) (0.234) (0.257)
Discount 0.151 0.033 0.382 0.273 0.126 0.053
(0.317) (0.28) (0.273) (0.297) (0.232) (0.254)
Rebate × low price 0.219 0.021 0.25 0.206 0.184 0.117
(0.33) (0.29) (0.298) (0.32) (0.269) (0.288)
Match × low price 0.916** 0.6** 0.695* 0.868** 0.391 0.512*
(0.391) (0.3) (0.36) (0.389) (0.257) (0.278)
Discount × low price 0.846** 0.35 0.68** 0.787** 0.322 0.37
(0.42) (0.294) (0.346) (0.385) (0.247) (0.277)
Covariatesa Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 428 428 558 428 558 428
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. For (1) and (2), robust standard
errors are reported. The no subsidy control treatment is used as baseline. (1),(3) and (4) use charity receipts as
dependent variable. All other models use the logarithm of charity receipts and charity receipts of zero are recoded
as log(0.1). For (3)–(6) values refer to the average marginal effects, which are based on the average change in the
dependent variable over all individuals. For each individual the change is calculated by taking the difference in
the dependent variable between receiving a particular subsidy at the low rate (rebate, match, discount) and not
receiving any subsidy or between receiving a particular subsidy at the high rate (rebate × low price, match × low
price, discount × low price) and receiving the same subsidy at the low rate.
aCovariates include gender, marital status, the Big Five personality dimensions, risk preferences, categorical
variables for age, income, residential environment, and religion, and dummies for whether the individual holds a
college degree, whether children under the age of 16 live in the household, whether the individual is a registered
voter, whether the individual frequently attends religious services, whether the individual works for a not-for-profit
organization and task order.
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